Introduction 16
Within the policy repertoire Western liberal democracies have to foster national belonging and 17 social cohesion, naturalization rules have come to hold a potentially important, yet quite 18 tenuous position, with the increase in immigration. Even though only few rights are typically 19 gained by naturalization (most importantly, national voting rights), it is perceived to hold 20 significant potential for shaping how immigrants end up identifying with the national 21 community. Indeed, naturalization policy has been reinvigorated in Western Europe since the 22 late 1990s. This has manifested itself in an increased use of language, knowledge and economic 23 2 requirements to condition access at the different stages in the naturalization trajectory, from 24 entry over permanent residence to citizenship (Goodman 2014; Stadlmair 2015) . These policy 25 instruments are typically grouped under the term 'civic integration policies'. For Christian 26 Joppke (2007) and Sarah Wallace Goodman (2014) , these policy instruments reflect West 27
European ideational convergence on a non-nationalist notion of the good citizen as liberal-28 minded, autonomous and (economically) self-sufficient. They see a retreat from nationalism in 29 policy-making that other scholars do not. Instead, these other scholars either argue that civic 30 integration policies are layered on top of existing policies (Kymlicka and Banting 2013; Meer 31 and Modood 2009) or that strong national differences remain in the interpretation of liberal and 32 democratic values. These differences, it is argued, both tie in with how the nation has 33 historically been imagined and how civic integration policies are designed and used today, if at 34 all (Levey 2014; Mouritsen 2013) . For these scholars, civic integration policies are but one 35 symptom of a more broad 'civic turn' towards nation-states more intensely and openly 36 questioning how to maintain a national citizenry conducive to a well-functioning liberal 37 democracy and welfare state in the wake of (non-Western) immigration (Mouritsen 2008) . 38
This article investigates how ideas concerning nationhood and social cohesion 39 have informed and legitimized the divergence of Danish, Swedish and Norwegian 40 naturalization policy in the last 15 to 20 years. Before 2001 none of the three had any formalized 41 integration requirements nor allowed for dual citizenship as a right. Moreover, until the 1970s, 42 citizenship legislation was almost identical in the three countries due to extensive political and 43 judicial cooperation. Today, Denmark requires nine years of legal residence combined with 44 tough language, knowledge, and self-sufficiency requirements but introduced dual citizenship 45 as a right in 2015. Sweden, on other hand, clearly deviates from the trend towards civic 46 integration policies by not demanding any kind of test, oath, or proof of integration as a 47
From the voluntarist perspective, nationhood is a choice people take based on 122 interacting and experiencing equal treatment within fair and well-functioning institutions. 123
Knowing that you are participating on equal, fair terms in the national project, you more easily 124 commit yourself to the nation. From this viewpoint, naturalization requirements might well be 125 superfluous or even counter-productive if they hinder the equal societal inclusion of 126 immigrants. Indeed, it implies that immigrant's identity and trust is politically manageable by 127 way of inclusion and institutional design (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) . 128
To sum up, these two ideal typical perspectives offers different answers to what 129 naturalization policy can actually do for the integration process based on different assumptions 130 about how individuals develop a strong sense of national belonging. Is it necessarily a slow-131 moving, non-voluntarist process that takes place outside the reach of naturalization policy 132 (organic), or can the state increase or decrease the tendency of newcomers to choose nationhood 133 using naturalization policy (voluntarist)? 134
We apply the two ideal types heuristically knowing well that each case, to some 135 extent, will mix both kinds of thinking. In addition, we wish to stress that the two ideal types 136 describe perceptions of how integration works (cf. Borevi 2017: 380). Moreover, any person or 137 organization can hold such a perception. In this article, we focus on the perceptions of political 138 parties and governments as expressed in key naturalization policy debates and documents. 139
The following three country analyses use both primary sources and existing 140 research. However, the data basis of the three analyses will appear different to the reader: The 141 analysis of Denmark is more oriented towards party politics; the Norwegian analysis focuses 142 more on policy documents/commissioned reports, while the Swedish analysis falls in between. 143 7 This is a consequence of different policy-making processes, and that naturalization has been a 144 much more politicized issue in Denmark than in Sweden or Norway (Green-Pedersen & 145 Krogstrup 2008) . Regarding the policy-making process, political initiation in Norway and 146 Sweden has been followed by the creation of a government-appointed commission that 147
independently reports on what is problematic about the existing rules and possible solutions. tightening the informal language requirement for naturalization and making no public debt a 181 requirement (Folketinget 1994 (Folketinget , 1995 (Folketinget and 1997 . In the remarks to the proposals and in the 182 parliamentary debates, the two parties argued that citizenship is the critical point from which 183 one becomes a full-fledged member of the nation. An often used phrase was that receiving 184 citizenship is a 'seal of approval' (blåt stempel) to call oneself Danish (Holm 2007, 107-09 (Venstre 2014, 23). 195 Behind this notion of deservingness is a resolute rejection of multiculturalism and reverence 196 for the historical and cultural foundation of the Danish welfare state and democracy. In the 197 latter half of the 1990s, this was expressed by the center-right parties as a strong discontent with 198 the new integration law (Holm 2007, 107-11, 179-891; Jørgensen 2006, 267-299) The Social Democrats have not adopted the nationalist rhetoric of the right-wing 234
parties, yet they have gradually adopted the ensuing restrictive requirements for permanent 235 residence and naturalization. In fact, the Social Democrats were part of the 2015 agreement to 236 strengthen naturalization requirements, and openly argued that they only agreed to relax the 237 rules in 2013 because they had to find a compromise with their coalition partners (Dahlin 2015) . 238
This has commonly been perceived as a strategical move to decrease the politicization of the 239 immigration issue which they tend to lose votes on (cf. Bale et al. 2009 ). Yet, the Social 240
Democrats have never committed themselves to a different discourse about the meaning of 241 11 citizenship and nationhood, or presented more multicultural ambitions (Jørgensen 2006) . 242
Instead, most disagreements with the center-right parties have arisen over whether the level of 243 the requirements are fair-that is, too demanding-albeit there is no real disputes over this 244 today.
245
When the Social Democrats in the late 1980s established a working group to draft 246 the party's integration policy, before the integration issue was being politicized by the center-247 right parties, the question of cultural differences was not addressed (Jønsson 2013) . When the 248 Social Democratic lead government introduced the new integration law in 1998, respect for 249 cultural differences was removed from the purpose clause despite being proposed in the report 250 of an expert committee (Jørgensen 2006, 291) was the most significant of these, also causing most disagreement in the committee itself as 291 well as in the informed public. But the question of requirements as to language skills and 292 knowledge of polity and society also caused some discussion. Besides, the committee was 293 explicitly asked to consider the importance of citizenship legislation for the integration of 294 foreigners and their participation in society. 295
The assignment of the preparatory committee came at a time when the general 296 opinion was believed to favour a liberalization of the Nationality Act. Norway had followed the 297 general tendency among advanced welfare states to the effect that the most significant social 298 and civil rights were extended to newcomers based on legal residency. Consequently, the spirit 299 of the time indicated a devalued significance of the law itself, thus making it less important to 300 keep exclusiveness in the form of single citizenship. And probably not least important, the 301 recent Swedish draft of 1999 had proposed dual citizenship as their new approach (SOU 1999, 302 34) .
11 The Norwegian committee delivered its report in 2000, yet it took another six years until 303 the legislative process was concluded. This suggests a complicated and controversial process, 304 during which a change in terms of political consensus on immigration and integration had taken 305 place. All the same, it would be an exaggeration to rate citizenship issues among the more 306 contentious public matters over the years. Citizenship law making in Norway has so far not 307 stirred much public interest, and the reform process was void of much of the emotional energy 308 that marks the rest of the immigration/integration sphere of politics. Thus, the usual party 309 cleavages on immigration concerns were toned down. What it should take to become a Norwegian citizen; what the Nationality Law itself should 332 reflect in terms of traditions and nationhood; and not least the kind of nationhood that should 333 be prescribed. Was it not for this one-person-minority of the committee, a professor who 334 delivered a comprehensive justification for his dissent, the outcome of the whole process might 335 have been different. The professor argued principled that one should regenerate the connection 336 between polity and society. The national community was described first and foremost as a 337 political community, yet the difficulty of differentiating between political and cultural 338 community was underlined: As a source of solidarity and identity, the citizenship institute "must 339 communicate with nation and ethnicity", he argued (NOU 2000:32) . The dissent was a 340 15 meticulous historical review, emphasizing the welfare state's significance for the building of 341 trust and traditions of equal treatment. He saw the institution of citizenship as part of this 342 tradition in polity, and wanted a discussion of the consequences to be drawn in terms of role 343 expectations for new citizens (p. 62). Dual citizenship was not to be accepted, as a reform to 344 this effect would weaken the equality dimension, as a part of the constituency would have 345 loyalty to more than one state. It would thus infringe on the existing Norwegian polity. The 346 minority also argued for both language and knowledge requirements as a condition for 347 naturalization. context, as it introduces the right to language training (cum courses on the social and political 372 system) coupled with work training and labor market preparations. 13 The law is path-breaking 373 as an integration instrument in the Norwegian setting, partly because it is mandatory and 374 conditions access to permanent residence ("a right and a duty"), and because in order to get the 375 salary (which is higher than the social benefits these categories used to depend on) one has to 376 show up and participate.
14 This law also functioned as an indirect language and knowledge 377 requirement for naturalization and subsequently, in 2005, documentation of completed 378 language training was included formally as a condition for naturalization. 379
Some of the perspectives of the new nationality law were announced already in 380 the white paper on inclusion and participation. Even if foreign citizens since 1983 have had the 381 right to vote in local elections, the government wanted as many as possible to gain full 382 citizenship in order to be able to vote in governmental elections and "participate more fully in 383 society". The premise for this wish was an interpretation of the naturalization institute 384 (symbolically and de facto) as an approval of the basic values of society, generally defined as 385 democracy, human rights and gender equality. The government wanted to see naturalization as 386 a formalization of the tacit societal contract existing between the citizen and the state. 387
In 2004, four years after the conclusion of the Citizenship Law Committee, the 388 Bondevik Government presented its law proposal to the parliament; interestingly enough using 389 17 the minority position of the committee as its basis on important issues. The government wanted 390 a clearer emphasis on the basic values of the Norwegian society, and it did not want dual 391 citizenship but rather requirements for naturalization in terms of language skills. Moreover, it 392 wanted to introduce a (voluntary) ceremony with an oath. Much of the motivation for this 393 governmental proposition also followed the minority of the committee in the sense that 394 upgrading or revitalization of the citizenship institution was on the agenda. immigrants to goods and entitlements which had previously been reserved for nationals (cf. 415 Hammar 1990; Soysal 1994; Joppke 2010; Spång 2011) . While being far from unique in this 416 respect, the trend of liberalization has been more extensive in Sweden than in Norway and 417 especially Denmark. Above all, it has been more lasting. The formative years of the 1970s 418 brought about a reduction in the required time of residence for naturalization from a minimum 419 of seven years to five years (four years for refugees and stateless people and two years for 420
Nordic nationals) (SOU 1974:69; Prop. 1975/76:136) , local and regional voting rights for 421 permanent residents (SOU 1975:15; Prop. 1975/76:23) , and a gradual dissolution of the 422 language requirement and the condition of self-sustenance (Szabó 1997, 56ff) . A defining 423 moment in the process of liberalization was the adoption of a multicultural policy in the mid-424 1970s, which built on public recognition of cultural diversity and equal rights for all residents 425 regardless of ethnic background and nationality. The new policy also consolidated a view of 426 integration as a process of voluntary and mutual adaptation, encouraging immigrants to 427 preserve their native cultures (SOU 1974:69; Prop. 1975:26; Soininen 1999) . In this pluralist 428 and voluntaristic view, integration is believed to be causally related to the inclusion and 429 empowerment of immigrants by the state, rather than to specific and explicit criteria of socio-430 cultural adaptation. Citizenship is one such state-administered instrument of inclusion, which 431 encourages immigrants to participate in public and economic life, and to become well-432 functioning members of society. had become severely outdated. In practice, dual citizenship had been accepted for a growing 446 number of exceptions-especially for immigrants whose countries of origin refused to 447 recognize renunciation of citizenship-amounting to an estimated accumulation of dual citizens 448 from 100,000 in the mid-1980s to 300,000 in 1997 (Gustafson 2002, 468) . The new law was 449 partly motivated as a full scale normalization of such exceptions by allowing dual citizenship 450 without reservations, but it was also motivated in more principled ways. 451
The parliamentary committee that was appointed to prepare a new law, the 452
Citizenship Committee, argued clearly in favor of dual citizenship in its final 1999 report (SOU 453 1999:34) . It held, first of all, that the expanding use of the principle of domicile had equalized 454 22 new citizens, and potential ways of using citizenship as an incitement to further integration 511 (SOU 2013:29, 69) . The connection between language, integration, and citizenship, was dealt 512 with extensively in the report that was delivered a year later. While recognizing the importance 513 of Swedish language proficiency, the committee concluded with the 1999 report that testing 514 was too blunt an instrument with too many negative side-effects; the main ones being the 515 difficulty of precise and efficient language assessment, and the excluding effects toward 516 immigrants with less opportunity and ability to learn Swedish (e.g., elderly, illiterates, 517 housewives). Along with previous investigations, it recommended other means of encouraging 518 naturalizing immigrants to learn Swedish (SOU 2013:29, 167-172) . Although initiated by a 519 liberal party with an interest in upgrading Swedish citizenship-above all through language 520 requirements-the end result was a somewhat watered-down bill (prop. 2013/14:143) , which 521 introduced voluntary ceremonies for new citizens, a new website on the importance of 522 citizenship, and extended equal birthright by descent on both the mother's and father's side. 523
The committee also suggested a four year fast-track, a so-called 'language bonus', enabling 524 immigrants who master the Swedish language to naturalize one year prematurely (see SOU  525 2013:29), but it was not included in the new law. 526
The above amendments to Swedish citizenship came into force in April 2015. It 527 is interesting to note both the civic integrationist impulse behind the changes and the 528 realignment of these changes with a pre-existing liberal legacy. The government wanted to 529 upgrade citizenship, both symbolically and materially, and use it as a carrot to more effectively 530 promote integration. It sought to introduce elements of desert to a legacy defined by free choice 531 and individual rights. The end result and its justification, however, complied more with the 532 liberal legacy by regarding integration as a voluntary process without unilaterally defined end 533 goals such as citizenship. Just like previous amendments and revisions, the bill confirmed the 534 view of naturalization being an encouragement to further integration; one that should be 535 23 distributed as universally and equally as possible without distinction between less and more 536 deserving. 537
To sum up, in Sweden (as in Norway) citizenship does not stir up vigorous public 538 debate and nationalist emotions. The effects of a generous (and increasingly contested) 539 immigration and refugee policy on the public discourse on citizenship have been marginal. 18 
540
For the most part, the policy development on issues of citizenship has been guided by 541 pragmatism and political consensus with few ideological conflicts (Spång 2007 
Concluding discussion 546
Despite being small, open economies with comprehensive, universal welfare states and 547 therefore exposed to the same kind of economic pressures from globalization and migration, 548 the three Scandinavian countries have developed their naturalization policy in very different 549 directions. These policies have not fluctuated much with the ideological orientation of 550 government. In each country, the large bloc-parties display a high degree of consensus on 551 naturalization policy. The extent to which the appearance of a successful far-right party has 552 pushed this consensus in a more restrictive direction even appears doubtful. Both Norway and 553
Denmark had a successful far-right party early on, yet have diverged because of different 554 responses from the center-right parties (Bale et al. 2009 ). And in Sweden, the recent success of 555 the Sweden Democrats has (so far) only served to strengthen the mainstream consensus. 556
These different reactions in the three countries, especially from the center-right 557 parties, seem closely linked to different dominant notions of nationhood. However, these 558 24 differences, according to our analysis, have less to do with the normative content of nationhood. 559
In all three countries, the universal welfare state, with the notions of equality and freedom it 560 embodies, is the single most cherished national treasure, the epitome of what these nations have 561
to offer and what they stand for. However, its causal ties to nationhood and social cohesion vary 562 between the three countries. 563
Sweden represents a voluntarist, bureaucratic, and administrative approach in 564 which citizenship is largely vacuous of popular sentimental registers. In fact, nationhood is a 565 highly sensitive concept that politicians tend to evade because it is typically associated with a 566 repertoire of ethnic symbols and sentiments. While still present and important in society, 567 national culture is largely viewed as a private matter, which, just like the Lutheran church, has 568 been divorced from state and citizenship. Instead, the Swedish state has committed itself to a 569 pluralist idea of cohesion that does not define one center but many. This understanding does 570 involve a rather indefinite civic notion of nationhood or Swedishness as an evolving process of 571 mutual acceptance and adaptation. Tolerance is a key liberal concept in this self-understanding 572 because it facilitates integration. The welfare state is proudly thought of as the very institutional 573 structure that generates such a positive and effective process of integration by promoting social 574 mobility and intercultural learning. However, this understanding also makes it difficult to define 575 one single finish line and reward for completed integration. Citizenship, accordingly, is seen as 576 an instrument to encourage and achieve integration through the extension of rights and (formal) 577 inclusion, on the assumption that once immigrants are institutionally included the institutions 578 will mold them into well-functioning citizens. Hence, the doctrine is one of voluntary 579 integration, in as much as it opposes mandatory tests and other proofs of integration, but it is 580 not laissez-faire and/or indifferent, since the end-goal is still national cohesion. 581
Danish politics, on the other hand, tend to revolve around an organic 582 understanding of the integration process. Here the welfare system (along with the democratic 583 25 traditions) is largely perceived as a fragile institutional structure built on civic cultural 584 homogeneity. The maintenance of interpersonal and institutional trust in Denmark is perceived 585 as dependent on a sense of nationhood that develops slowly and organically conditional on 586 being immersed in Danish welfare state life. Consequently, naturalization becomes a screening 587 process for who deserves to become a member of the nation. However, the concept of 588 nationhood is typically not associated with ethnic imagery but with a comforting sense of 589 togetherness concentrated around a particular Danish realization of social justice and liberal-590 democratic norms and values. Even though this leaves considerable room for cultural 591 differences, the reproduction of these so-called Danish norms and values are typically 592 understood as presupposing a certain privatization of religion, egalitarian family life and 593 dedication to interaction with native Danes through settlement, day care, school, work and 594
